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<ABS-TX>The European Union’s (EU) 2018 Audiovisual Media Services Directive attempted 
to level the playing field upon which video sharing platforms and audiovisual media services 
compete by evening out advertising and consumer protection rules. Recent competition policy 
literature identifies data as a source of dominance in platform markets, suggesting its relevance 
to such situations where platforms compete with other services. Drawing on a study of this 
playing field involving stakeholder interviews and a comparison of regulatory frameworks, we 
present a nuanced understanding of imbalances across three distinct functions of data. We 
consider the policy implications, arguing for more equitable access to insight from aggregate, 
anonymized data and financial data.</ABS-TX> 
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<T1>In October 2018, member of the European Parliament Sabine Verheyen announced the 
adoption of the European Union’s (EU) new Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), 
 
saying, “we have established a fair, level playing field.”1 She was referring to the field on 
which, according to the Directive’s preamble, video sharing platforms (VSPs), such as 
YouTube, Snapchat, and Facebook, “compete for the same audiences and revenues as 
audiovisual media services.”2 The intention came from concerns about the consequences of the 
expansion of advertising supported online platforms for what we might call traditional media, 
the audiovisual media services, and press publishers, fueled by evidence of stagnating or falling 
revenues and by very vocal European broadcasters. The AVMSD accomplished only one piece 
of what should be a holistic approach to dealing with the expansion of global online platforms 
into the business of media upon which we depend for information, news, entertainment, and 
other public interest purposes, but, we argue, its drafters approach of setting levelness among 
similar services as their policy aim offers great promise.  
<T>The Directive created the category of VSPs to delineate those platforms that enable the 
sharing of audiovisual user-generated content and are, therefore, most akin to audiovisual 
media services. Bringing them into the Directive’s scope established similar qualitative rules 
for advertising and consumer protection for them as exist for audiovisual media services. While 
this may be fairer (given the range of concerns about platform dominance and unfair 
competition),3 it seemed unlikely that disparity in these rules was the sole or even the main 
source of any unevenness, or that fixing it would significantly level the playing field on which 
VSPs compete with audiovisual media services. We therefore sought to understand the 
dynamics on the playing field and identify any additional sources of any unevenness. In an area 
where much attention has been paid to trying define markets and identify barriers to entry, our 
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approach instead closely examined what could be considered the nature of play in a game that 
both platforms, namely VSPs, and other services are playing.     
<T>Our investigation into the dynamics of audiovisual advertising revealed multiple sources 
of unevenness in the field of competition between audiovisual media services and VSPs. The 
most prominent of these, which we elaborate here, was the way data was used in the buying 
and selling of ad inventory. Though in advertising markets users or audiences and advertisers 
are linked through indirect network effects,4 here, we were concerned about competition for 
advertiser budgets rather than competition for attention. VSPs compete with other media 
offering video ad inventory, including audiovisual media services, largely through the same 
agencies and major advertisers. 
<T>In this article, we elaborate the imbalances in the ability of various players, including 
media agencies, to access and use data. Recent literature5 and policy debates have focused on 
the extent to which online platforms derive advantage from amassing the personal data of 
individual users necessary for personalization. Our investigation, however, found additional 
sources of unevenness related to data use, especially ones involving potentially nonpersonal 
(through anonymization and aggregation) or originally nonpersonal data. The article’s first 
contribution is the identification of three functions of data that describe how data was being 
used and that reveal where differential access to specific kinds of data was a source of 
advantage for VSPs. Its second contribution is to consider what these findings indicate for 
assessing the policy tools that might be appropriate to further level the playing field. 
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<T>The next section of this article provides a short account of the AVMSD and briefly outlines 
the concerns raised in the literature about unfair competition involving online platforms. 
Section three describes our methodology, which involved interviews with key informants and 
examination of the regulatory frameworks in Belgium, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. 
Section four then elaborates the three functions of data evident in the accounts of how decisions 
are made and how data is used in the distribution of advertising budgets. Categorizing these 
functions of data across the whole system, rather than looking at platform data in isolation, 
allowed us to see where platform data is used in the same or in a similar manner to other data, 
such as from audience measurement bodies or from audiovisual media service providers. This 
section shows disparities in access to the aggregate data related to campaign performance and 
financial data on costs to be sources of unevenness and discusses how these were shaped by 
regulatory frameworks. This is followed by section five, in which we discuss the implications 
of these findings for potential interventions to level the playing field. Here, within each 
function we draw parallels with how data used in the trade in advertising on audiovisual media 
services has been governed to identify the specific policy challenges relevant to each function. 
Based on the evidence, we argue that policy making and regulatory innovation should focus on 
the anonymized or pseudonymized aggregate data and the data resulting from financial 
transactions that contribute to campaign and channel metrics and that indicate the full value of 
advertising inventory. Finally, in section six, we conclude with some suggestions for potential 
policy interventions to address those challenges and further level the playing field as additional 
pieces of a more holistic approach. 
<H1>New Players and a Changing Game 
<T1>In the late 1980s, when the precursor to the AVMSD, the Television without Frontier 
Directive (TWFD) was being drafted and debated, press publishers lobbied in support of limits 
 
on advertising for television broadcasters.6 At that time, advertising supported broadcast media 
and print publishers were the main recipients of advertiser budgets, and although they were 
very different media, there was clear competition for those budgets. Two underlying 
assumptions underpinning EU policy since the TWFD are that consumers need some protection 
in relation to advertising and that at the same time citizens’ interests are served by having 
commercial media whose independent subsistence is sustained by advertising.7 When the 
TWFD was replaced by the AVMSD in 2007, policy makers were convinced by arguments 
made by television and advertising industry bodies, among others, that change was needed due 
to convergence and could be made without detriment to the viewer.8 Limits on product 
placement and advertising were somewhat relaxed. By the time the AVMSD was reopened 
again for revision in 2016, the game was different. New players were on the field, and this time 
it was the audiovisual media services that were calling for limits on their new competitors, the 
advertising supported online platforms. 
<T>There was ample evidence that the spread of online platforms had been disruptive to 
traditional media, albeit more so to press publishers than audiovisual media.9 In response to 
the consultation that kicked off the revision of the AVMSD, a majority of respondents 
expressed the view that the existing rules did not contribute to a level playing field.10 EU policy 
makers were apparently sympathetic to the concerns about unfair competition to audiovisual 
media services from video on demand services and online platforms offering user-generated 
content. Recital 44 of the Directive amending the AVMSD acknowledges competition between 
audiovisual media services and “VSPs,” and states that it is intended, among other things, to 
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ensure “as much as possible a level playing field.”11 Online platforms for disseminating user-
generated content had been considered information service providers, and as such enjoyed 
exemption from liability for the content they carried under the E-Commerce Directive.12 
Though it avoids directly contradicting the E-Commerce Directive, the revised AVMSD 
introduces the category of VSPs, bringing services such as YouTube, Vimeo, and even 
Facebook into its the scope. It makes VSPs responsible (not liable) for protecting minors from 
harmful content, protecting all consumers from illegal content, and abiding by the same 
qualitative rules on advertising that apply to audiovisual media services. 
<T>Media policy scholarship on the AVMSD and its predecessor has long dealt with questions 
about competition among services. The Directive is an industrial policy operating in a cultural 
space and has been a balancing act between interventionists seeking to protect domestic and 
European industries and advocates of freer market.13 Scholars have been concerned about the 
extent to which the Directive’s elimination of borders and common standards disadvantages 
some services within Europe, namely those from smaller member states.14 Trappel, for 
example, argued that imbalances in production capacity between countries are an inherent 
source of unevenness that were exacerbated rather than rectified, especially for small states 
that shared a language with a larger neighbor.15 
<T>The Directive, even in its earliest form, was intended to strengthen European services in 
the face of competition from US-based content and services,16 and boost the potential for 
innovation in pan-European services that could compete globally.17 As technology and types 
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of services evolved, research interest moved from questions about the role of the Directive in 
European competition with US content producers and broadcast services18 to questions about 
how European policy might adress the new challenges posed by competition between European 
services and US-based global platforms.19 
<T>Already in 2009, Valcke and Lievens argued that with the version adopted in 2007, 
European policymakers had missed a chance by not including the platforms now defined as 
VSPs back then, suggesting that a technologically neutral approach should actually create a 
completely level playing field for online and offline, linear and nonlinear services.20 Shortly 
after, Pauwels and Donders pointed out that the dividing lines between linear and nonlinear 
services upon which the differentiated rules of the Directive’s two-tiered approach were based 
had blurred and that the emergence of YouTube and other platforms had made the Directive 
obsolete.21 The 2018 changes that brought VSPs into scope have yet to be fully implemented. 
Nevertheless an emerging literature is concerned with how this will work given the nature of 
platforms and the implications for content producers that use them.22 The focus of this evolving 
body of research has remained on the even application of rules, namely those in the AVMSD, 
and the widening scope of these rules as new types of services emerge, however on competition 
issues with online platforms there is also a significant body of work from competition scholars 
and regulators that indicates such rules might play only a small role in shaping the field. 
<T>Much of the existing competition policy scholarship is limited in that it looks at platforms 
within narrowly defined markets. It considers whether or not there are barriers that would 
prevent new companies from providing the same service and the behavior of platforms is often 
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considered in the abstract rather than investigated empirically. Reports by competition 
regulators or in the context of policy process have generated much of the recent evidence on 
how concrete platforms compete with each other and in adjacent markets.23 These are primarily 
efforts to understand platform dominance and assess potential abuse of that dominance or 
unfair competition, yet, they can begin to sketch a picture not just of the behavior of platform 
owning companies, but also of the playing fields—shaped by rules and regulatory conditions—
that may or may not contribute to any anticompetitive behavior. 
<T>The issue of dominance has been examined using the concept of market power and 
considering questions related to how platforms acquire and exercise this power and the extent 
to which antitrust measures are equipped to deal with it. Barwise and Watkins traced how 
several global online platforms have grown through a host of different means including 
creating propriety standards, exploiting user data secured consistently through high switching 
costs and lock-in effects, strategic acquisitions, and others.24 Others have pointed out that large 
platform owning companies have been able to leverage market power across markets or a 
whole value chain,25 for example, when a company’s share in the social media market is 
leveraged in support of its programmatic advertising trading platform. Mergers and 
acquisitions have been crucial to this kind of cross market power. Alexiadis’ work suggests 
that decisions in the key cases, many of which were waved through by the European 
Commission, were not particularly well-informed or consistent initially, with Google’s 
acquisition of DoubleClick, a demand-side platform for ad serving, being probably the most 
controversial.26 The complex nature of platforms, which involves network effects and often 
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multisided markets, poses unique challenges for anti-trust intervention.27 Nevertheless, failures 
in the application of anti-trust measures and unhealthy concentrations of ownership in value 
chains that stretch across markets could contribute to uneven playing conditions for 
competition with online platforms, including VSPs. 
<T>A specific issue that has emerged from the field of competition policy is the role of data, 
as scholars have attempted to understand the extent to which anticompetitive practices or 
barriers to market entry stem from vast troves of personal data held by platforms. Data has long 
been considered an asset in online platform markets.28 Those that argue platforms’ amassing 
of vast amounts of personal data is not a source of competition problems cite as pro-competitive 
the contribution big data makes toward quality improvement and innovation, and claim 
consumer welfare enhanced by the fact that it allows services to be free to the consumer.29 
Sokol and Comerford, for example, argue that “firms can easily and quickly collect data from 
consumers upon launch, and both data and the tools needed to store and analyze it are readily 
available from numerous third party sources.”30 This view is based on the assumption that 
personal data is not exclusive and relies on businesses and individual users being able to freely 
move or give their data to other platforms in order to switch or multihome.31 
<T>Others have generated evidence that challenges the assumption that advertisers easily 
switch or multi-home. As Kraemer and Wohlfarth found, the data used in advertising is not 
given at a singular point in time, but is continually refreshed by the observance of user 
behavior.32 Newman found, in his investigation of search advertising, that what is used is “not 
just data on each individual user, but the cumulative data that can reveal how similar users 
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behave.”33 High-level expert committees in both the United Kingdom and the United States 
recently concluded that in the large online platforms derive such significant benefits of scale 
from their steady flows of user data, some markets may have “tipped” and require 
intervention.34 
<T>The competition policy literature has not yet sufficiently looked at where platforms 
compete with other types of firms. Here questions would revolve less around the conditions 
needed for another company to provide a similar platform and more around what conditions 
would be most fair for both platforms and the other firms with which they compete. The 
AVMSD essentially provides minimum standards for the quality of the ad inventory VSPs 
provide by establishing qualitative criteria for ads, essentially ensuring that VSPs and 
audiovisual media services must at least play by similar rules in this area. However, the 
arguments and evidence emerging from competition policy research suggest that any playing 
field on which VSPs compete may be shaped by the extent to which they can benefit from 
leveraging power from other markets in which they operate, particularly that stemming from 
their accumulation and use of personal data. Other interventions may therefore be necessary in 
order to further level the playing field, but to assess this we must understand more about the 
conditions shaping it. 
<H1>Methodology 
<T1>As mentioned earlier, in the debates leading up to the revision of the AVMSD, providers 
of audiovisual media services had been very vocal with claims that platforms such as YouTube 
were competing with them directly for viewers and advertisers while not having to comply by 
the same rules. Given the issues raised in competition policy scholarship, we were skeptical 
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that this relationship was so direct and that differing rules in relation to content and advertising 
were the main source of any advantage the platforms might have. Our objective was to 
understand the dynamics of the trade in video advertising and uncover any sources of 
unevenness. 
<T>We chose Belgium, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom as the locations for our 
investigation. Although our aim was not to elaborate country cases, we wanted to ensure we 
reached practitioners working in a variety of market environments, national and transnational. 
Though all well-developed Western European markets, they varied in market size and degrees 
of reliance on programmatic and addressable options. For example, the United Kingdom has 
the most mature digital ad market of the four countries studied while its TV advertising market 
remains an important component of the media mix, and addressable TV is highly advanced.35 
Both France and Belgium have mature markets when it comes to digital advertising in relation 
to the entire ad market but less reliance on programmatic options. Unlike the others’, Italy’s 
TV ad market remains the most important form of advertising and is still growing.36 Another 
consideration was variety within the regulatory frameworks, because although all shared the 
common application of EU law, this is an area where there has been only minimum 
harmonization. France has a long history of protectionism toward its creative industries and its 
lawmakers have intervened to push transparency in the advertising trade, a rather opposite 
approach than the United Kingdom’s one of liberalization and minimal intervention. Belgium 
is a small country essentially composed of three smaller markets, with regulatory powers 
devolved to “communautés”, and the specific market and regulatory condition of small states 
has been recognized.37 We did not attempt to define the specific market for video advertising 
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and calculate shares in each of these jurisdictions. Instead, we assumed that some of this 
ecosystem operates transnationally, an assumption born out in our investigation, and that a 
variety of factors might be shaping the nature of competition within it. We combined interviews 
with key informants from companies involved in both the buying and selling of video 
advertising and compared the legal frameworks in which this trade was taking place. 
<T>We interviewed a total of 36 people across 26 interviews, some of which were with teams 
within an individual workplace. Most were elite interviews with people with particular 
positions of authority within their institutions while three were expert interviews with people 
from institutions not involved directly in the trade.38 Sampling was purposive with individuals 
identified through industry contacts and by trawling through corporate web pages and LinkedIn 
profiles. Twelve were from companies on the demand side, agencies and advertisers, and 11 
were from ones on the supply side, including both VSPs and AVMS providers.39 We took an 
approach to interviewing that aimed to be presuppositionless,40 rather than one that attempted 
to test any of the arguments that had been made about the nature of competition, and we did 
not assume the playing field was uneven. We asked questions about how decisions were made 
by those who determined how to spend advertising budgets on the demand side, how those on 
the supply side sold their inventory and set their prices, what kinds of metrics or other 
considerations came into play, what kind of relationships existed among the players, and how 
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both demand and supply side players thought of the various advertising inventory options and 
the other players in the ecosystem. 
<T>Interview transcripts were coded thematically using Nvivo in two layers by first 
identifying topics and then what was said within topics. The initial coding covered broad 
themes such as ad products, decision-making, metrics and measurement, data issues, 
relationships, innovation, the role of programmatic, and competition concerns. The word 
frequency functions within Nvivo were used to help confirm salience and identify themes. The 
second level of coding was done within the themes identified in the first round and mapped out 
in a spreadsheet.41 Attention was paid to begin coding at alternating ends of the transcript list 
so as not to be consistently influenced by starting with demand or supply sides. 
<T>The legal framework analysis covered legislation, regulatory decisions, and self-regulatory 
instruments in the following areas: consumer protection (in relation to advertising), data 
protection, taxation (as applicable to the relevant companies), competition and pluralism, 
advertising standards, and content rules. These were filled into a matrix through which 
similarities and differences were identified. The purpose was both to assess the regulatory 
conditions that may be affecting the levelness of competition and to triangulate interview 
accounts. Slight differences were identified in relation to product placement and sponsorship 
rules, misleading and comparative advertising rules, and media pluralism and cross ownership 
rules.42 The treatment of personal data was harmonized across all four cases by the introduction 
of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), but we found significant differences in the 
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legal obligations related to the disclosure of nonpersonal data stemming from the financial 
transactions of advertising that will be discussed in detail as follows. 
<T>This investigation was only conducted in relatively advanced Western European contexts43 
and was further limited by its focus on the trade of video advertising inspired by the debates 
about the leveling of the playing field for that trade around the revision of the AVMSD. 
Although other forms were mentioned by interviewees and covered by the legislative 
frameworks, it was not within the scope of the project to consider other forms of display 
advertising, search, outdoor and experience, or other below the lines options. The sample did 
not include representatives of press publishers, non-VSP online platforms, or providers of 
outdoor inventory. From this mixed method investigation, we found differences in access to 
and ability to utilize both personal and nonpersonal data to be a source of unevenness in the 
playing field. The details of these imbalances were illuminated in the accounts of how the 
various actors use data and the frameworks in which this use takes place. We categorized these 
into three distinct functions that are elaborated in the following section. 
<H1>Three Functions of Data in the Ecosystem 
<T1>Even well before online platforms got into the business, advertising relied heavily on data. 
Audience measurement data was combined with data from panel surveys and focus groups 
about the attitudes, preferences, and behavior of various categories of people. This type of data 
is voluntarily given, aggregated, and anonymous. The technology of online platforms allows 
for the collection of data about individuals by observing their behavior and by inferring 
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characteristics from patterns in their behavior.44 Such data can be linked to an individual, or it 
can be aggregated to generate information about groups of similar people or about any given 
campaign, ad inventory, or channel. The buying and selling of video advertising inventory also 
generates nonpersonal data related to the financial transactions and revenues generated. We 
found these different types of data being used in a number of ways within the ecosystem and 
that categorizing them into distinct functions helped to identify how the imbalances in the use 
of data contribute to uneven competition. 
<T>We identified three functions of data, each of which describes a category of ways data was 
used in the trade for inventory on both VSPs and audiovisual media services. The first, the 
targeting function, covers how data from various sources is used in the targeting of users of 
VSPs and both users and audiences of audiovisual media services. The second function is that 
of strategy design and is largely the domain of media agencies. It describes how data is used 
by those who primarily determine how advertiser budgets are spend. The final function we 
describe is that of telling the story of success. This is how data is used by all the inventory 
holders and the media agencies to establish value and faith in their performance, and to build 
the long-term relationships that the evidence showed remained very important, despite the 
growth of programmatic trading. In this section, we elaborate each function in turn. 
<H2>Targeting Audience/Users 
<T1>The major VSPs have vast numbers of consenting individual users who can be identified 
and from whom they can gather personal information that can be used by advertisers to target 
them. This includes data volunteered by users, but more importantly for targeting, it includes 
observed data and inferred data generated through user engagement with the platforms and 
other services for which the platform has gained consent. The value of this data does not derive 
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from its collection at a specific moment in time but from it being continuous, providing insight 
into user preferences and ad campaigns performance. Those collecting this data need to have 
the trust of users and ensure continuous use.45 
<T>When looking at the way data is used in targeting, this continuous feed of personal data 
functions similarly to the way continuous audience measurement data and data from regular 
panel surveys does for advertising on audiovisual media services. In targeting advertising on 
both VSPs and audiovisual media services the value of data lies both in connecting an ad to the 
right person and in generating the insight into how similar consumers might behave. The first 
purpose is simply about delivery, whether to a known individual user watching a live stream 
on Twitch or a video on YouTube, or to an group of people likely to fit a particular demographic 
known to watch a cooking program on a national broadcaster. For delivering an ad to a known 
individual, personal data is required to execute the delivery. The second purpose is generating 
insight into how various type of people or groups might behave or for creating consumer 
archetypes or “twins” that agencies use to establish which consumers they wanted to reach and 
how. For this purpose, the personal nature of the data was irrelevant. 
<T>Multiple respondents talked enthusiastically about the possibilities of targeting, describing 
how third-party data, data from the platforms offering ad inventory, and customer data from 
advertisers were used to target in new creative ways. One example given was how data 
purchased from Oath (now Verizon Media) about individuals’ cinema ticket purchases 
harvested from their e-mails was used to target individual cinemagoers with online 
advertisements. Another respondent recounted how his agency produced a series of short 
online ads that built on each other in a narrative, but with multiple options for the direction of 
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the narrative that were chosen depending on how the user behaved following the previous one. 
Nevertheless, the agencies need for identifiable data is limited. 
<T>For example, Jane Doe is 25-year-old female in Seattle. She is a moviegoer who sees 
Japanese anime films in cinemas (as reported by her e-mail provider) and watches a lot of 
anime on YouTube, as well as lot of cake decorating videos and ones related to a few particular 
video games. Her tastes in music have been tracked by her online listening and Spotify 
playlists. The data on all this is combined with that of many others with shared characteristics 
to create a model of people with her tastes and behavior. Jess Dee a 25-year-old female who 
shares tastes in music and video games with Jane. She is not very familiar with anime but gets 
targeted by a trailer for an anime film while watching a cake decorating video because the 
“twin” created from the observation of Jane and others like her indicates she might be 
interested. Only the ad server placing the ad at the start of her YouTube video had to be able 
to identify her. 
<T>This kind of very granular targeting and engagement with specific individuals was not 
necessarily always called for by campaign objectives. Every agency respondent interviewed 
reported that the first consideration in planning is what the client wants to achieve with 
advertising, their objectives. Most explained that meeting longer term objectives such as brand 
building, attitude shifting, or awareness campaigns still start with television advertising as the 
central piece. When the objectives were more short term, such as to drive sales with a specific 
group, get repeat business from previous customers, or to test the waters with something a bit 
experimental, then campaigns required higher levels of targeting. As described by agency 
respondents, the targeting possibilities and data sets of YouTube were not directly competing 
with those of the United Kingdom’s ITV or Italy’s Mediaset, or even with those of Facebook. 
 
<T>AVMSs are also investing in inventory options that offer more targeting possibilities than 
linear TV. Major AVMSs in the countries studied offered some addressable TV options via 
set-top boxes, such as Sky’s AdSmart in the United Kingdom. Most major services had moved 
to sign-in based catch-up services. Both set-top boxes and sign-ins provide data that can be 
used for targeting and increase the amount and diversity of inventory services can sell. The 
observation of one agency respondent that “sales houses and broadcasters are really evolving 
to digital activities in order to get this data because if you have only television activities, you 
won’t have this data” was confirmed by respondents from AVMS providers in all four 
countries. Some AVMSs are essentially pooling their data sets by cooperating on tools to offer 
addressable and programmatic buying options at scale both on a European level, for example, 
through the European Broadcasting Exchange46 or within a national jurisdiction, such as the 
cooperation between RTL and ProSiebenSat1.47 
<T>In all four countries studied, the use of personal data for targeting individuals was governed 
by GDPR,48 and there were no other sector-specific rules on personal data. Article 4 of the 
GDPR defines data controllers and data processors. Controllers, such as the VSPs and AMVS 
providers, are responsible for determining the purposes and means of processing personal data, 
whereas processors are responsible for the processing of data on behalf of the controller, and 
controllers have to get consent for all the processing that is done with data they have gathered.49 
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<T>Advertiser, agency, and VSP respondents commented that they had noticed a loss of some 
players after the GDPR came into effect, mainly third-party data suppliers, but welcomed this 
as cleaning up those engaged in unsavory practices. Respondents from five different AVMS 
providers reported in some way that GDPR compliance for them as controllers was difficult or 
a burden, and two complained that they had to deal with consent on behalf of all those 
processors in the programmatic trading system that might engage with the data they controlled. 
Five respondents from across the categories argued that the GDPR had increased the 
dominance of the global VSP-owning companies engaged in programmatic trading, citing 
Google in particular for pushing trade onto its own platforms by cutting off others’ access to 
data for which it was a controller.50 
<T>There remains a large gap between the amount of personal data that AVMSs hold on 
individual audience members and what VSPs have on their users, and differences exist among 
VSPs. As long as advertiser objectives continue to require varying levels of targeting, the 
specificity with which the individual users or audiences of AVMSs and VSPs could be seen as 
part of the differentiation of inventory. Control over the personal data required to link ads to 
specific individuals is also justifiably limited by data protection rules. Much of the data used 
to determine whom to target and by what means, however, is removed from the individual in a 
similar way that it is removed from individuals who have participated a panel survey. Where 
we did find evidence of unevenness was in the tools used to purchase, serve, and verify targeted 
ads that generate the data that feeds into media strategy making and planning. 
<H2>Determining Strategy 
 
50 Google plays the role of controller in some services and as processor in other services. For the division, see 
Businesses and Data. 
 
<T1>The way agency respondents spoke about the process of determining how advertising 
budgets are allocated across what they referred to as different channels was most akin to a cook 
working out a recipe. It starts with the objectives of the advertiser, which are often shaped by 
the type of product or service, and then prices and a host of metrics representing historical 
experience are plugged into complex econometric modeling. As one agency respondent 
described: 
<QO>“what we’re looking at is we’ve been able to track the effectiveness of every one of those 
media partners in its ability to deliver a sale at the end of the day, we attribute a cost per action 
against all of those. And then we will make adjustments and we will re-plan based on historic 
performance.”</QO> 
<T>Those designing strategies talked about two types of data as important at this stage: 
anonymized aggregate observed data from previous campaigns and nonpersonal data 
indicating cost. Here we found sources of unevenness for those vying to have their inventory 
included in campaign strategies stemming from imbalances in access to campaign metrics and 
other information with which the potential effectiveness of inventory was assessed and upon 
which prices were based. 
<T>Though there was little choice in the measurement data used for broadcast inventory, these 
were provided by independent industry bodies in all countries studied. Those metrics were 
universally accepted, audited, and available at transparent rates to inventory holders, agencies, 
advertisers, and others. While the amount and variety of data that can feed into modeling 
effectiveness for online inventory was vastly greater, it was not standardized or audited, and 
who had access to it appeared dependent on opaque relationships with intermediaries and third-
party providers. 
 
<T>A key tool talked about was the ad server, which gathers the data related to each ad 
placement that was aggregated to produce campaign and channel metrics.51 Third-party 
trackers are also crucial for measuring the effectiveness of online advertising. There are a 
number of companies offering such services, and often inventory holders engage with more 
than one. However, multiple agency respondents reported that Google’s ad server is 
overwhelmingly used, and Google’s and Facebook’s trackers are by far the most common.52 
Only a limited number of third parties have been approved for tracking on Google’s YouTube53 
since GDPR went into effect, and multiple agency respondents expressed suspicion about the 
provision of such data by the platforms that also offer inventory. 
<T>One agency representative explained, 
<QO>“[i]t’s well-known that you don’t get the same amount of data as Google and 
Facebook will get. For instance, you get, at best, impressions in aggregate from Facebook and 
then when Facebook-- I think this example is probably true. When Facebook track, they track 
in a way that’s very favorable to them.”</QO> 
<T>Another respondent gave an example of how a platform set the terms for what counts as 
an impression with less viewability and a shorter duration than what they consider the 
minimum, resulting in a discrepancy between what they reported to their client to show 
effectiveness and what was charged by the platform and costed into the budgets. 
 
51 The word “channel” here is used as it is by those in the advertising industry to mean, they type of medium for 
example linear television, radio, outdoor display, search, social media, and so on. 
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<T>For online and addressable TV inventory data such as about the quantity and quality of 
views, click through to webpages or the minisites accessible on addressable TV is gathered 
through the delivery platforms. Inventory on Google’s YouTube and on Facebook can only be 
bought through their own trading platforms. Their tools were also reported to be the 
unavoidable choice for the purchase of other online inventory because of what eight different 
respondents referred to as “walled gardens.” The term refers to the data environment that is 
controlled by one company that may allow users to import data but only allow selected 
aggregate data to be extracted.54 One such complaint was that because a client used Google 
Analytics on their own website, the agency was then locked into using Google’s demand-side 
platform to activate the campaign. While the advertiser and the agency according to contract 
“owned” the data stemming from their own campaigns, they explained that they could not use 
it outside of the Google “garden.” 
<T>Google and Facebook are not alone in this practice. A respondent from another VSP 
described a similar practice and a strict policy against allowing third-party tracking. Two 
representatives from AVMSs confirmed that their companies were modeling their own data 
“walled gardens” after the practice of the platforms, in part to avoid opening up their 
addressable inventory to Google’s trading platforms. Most AVMS providers and even smaller 
VSPs are not also providers of analytics services or third part tracking, meaning the depth of 
the campaign data they offer within their “gardens” will be limited and as will their ability to 
drive buyers into them. 
<T>The other type of data involved in determining strategy and dividing up budgets is price. 
Media agencies that do the buying of inventory have historically made their profits from the 
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difference between what they can get as the price for the inventory and what they can charge 
the client. This is an arbitrage system in which agencies pool their buying across clients and 
campaigns, getting a lower price than the advertiser could individually, and include a margin 
for themselves. Though for some services agencies reported having moved to a flat fee, it was 
confirmed by multiple respondents from agencies, advertisers, and inventory holders that the 
discounts and rebates characteristic of media buying in broadcasting and print media were still 
common practice despite the expansion of programmatic trading. One advertiser respondent 
working across Europe claimed that cash rebates and kickbacks were even more common for 
online inventory in some countries. 
<T>In the accounts of both demand- and supply side respondents, past performance metrics, 
expected audience/user reach, and pricing information appeared crucial to these negotiations. 
The financial data resulting from the buying and selling of advertising is special category of 
nonpersonal data. It can be in big datasets, such as the price achieved on vast numbers of nearly 
instantaneous auctions in programmatic buying systems or can be cumulated into a few 
regularly reported figures. Among the regulatory frameworks we examined, only in France 
were there requirements for the disclosure and reporting of financial that were equivalent for 
all inventory holders. 
<T>In 1993, France introduced an anti-corruption law regulating the purchase of advertising 
space, known as the “Sapin Law.”55 Initially, this piece of legislation aimed to address harms 
to advertisers and media companies from the lack of transparency in the arbitrage buying of 
advertising inventory by media agencies. An alternative to the structured shared-based systems 
of other jurisdictions, the Sapin law requires an agency to communicate any discount or tariffs 
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advantages made by the media organization to the advertiser to avoid exorbitant profit margins. 
The law was amended in 2015 to broaden its scope to digital advertising (article 20). 
Henceforth, an advertiser is also entitled to know the cost of an entire campaign as well as the 
price paid for each advertising space purchased in digital advertising. A decree n 2017-159 
adopted in February 2017 includes specific rules for programmatic advertising or other real-
time bidding. From January 1, 2018, all intermediation charges (whether human or artificial 
intelligence [AI]) must be communicated to advertisers. There are now requirements to report 
campaign data, such as on the dissemination environment where the advertising is featured, the 
content, the format, the number of impressions, pages visited and clicks, as well the total 
amount invoiced. 
<T>The French competition authority found that the expansion of the Sapin law to digital 
advertising was seen as a positive step by many actors including major online platforms and 
intermediaries.56 This overall approval was mirrored by our interviewees from agencies in 
France who wanted to see it harmonized at the EU level, though they did note it was not without 
cost. As one noted, “at a personal level, I think that yes [the Sapin law is a good thing], at a 
professional level, it is difficult for companies because this adds many administrative 
constraints that the legislator may not have foreseen.” Examination of the legislation suggested 
that there will likely be practical uncertainties as to who is obliged to fulfil these new 
obligations. In addition, it only applies to the French territory, which gives it limited scope 
within an ecosystem where the majority of the actors are located elsewhere.57 The Sapin Law 
only ensures transparency to advertisers, but it does allow advertisers see what exactly they are 
spending their money on and what makes up the prices they pay. 
 
56 Autorité de la concurrence. 
57 This being said, article 27 does make an attempt at broadening the reach of this legislation beyond the French 
territory but difficulties remain in practice. 
 
<T>In the United Kingdom, a certain level of financial transparency for television advertising 
was achieved by the fact that media owners participate in a share-based system that is based 
on advertiser commitments for total multiyear spend and the audience measurement data. In 
the past, it has formed the basis for remedies to protect competition in the Carleton/Grenada 
merger that became ITV.58 It may not directly reveal any discounts or rebates, especially in the 
form of airtime in lieu. However, combined with the required revenue reporting to the regulator 
Ofcom and the transparent audited audience measurement data, it seemed to provide the players 
some transparency. Similar systems were present in Belgium and Italy. In Italy, the regulator 
required platforms, even those taxed abroad, to provide advertising revenue data in a manner 
equivalent to the requirements for audiovisual media services, for the specific purpose of 
protecting competition in media markets.59 
<T>In each country, those selling television inventory had access to the historical audience 
data of others offering television inventory from the independent measurement bodies. In 
Belgium, Italy, and the United Kingdom, the share-based buying systems and the regular 
financial reporting required by the regulators gave a degree of transparency regarding the prices 
paid for inventory in the past, which can help them assess and represent to buyers the value of 
their inventory. With agencies moving from television strategies to multi-platform video 
strategies, television broadcasters and online platforms are negotiating with the same agencies 
for the discounts and rebates yet have very different information. In this function, the lack of 
transparency reported to us and since identified also by others in the data on performance, price 
and profits in the trade of online advertising60 gives the large platforms informational 
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advantage, not just relation to the others competing for advertising budgets, but also vis-a-vis 
the agencies with which they are negotiating. 
<T>Some progress has been made with YouTube in terms of participation in the independent 
audited system for measuring reach and audience in Germany. After three years of working on 
measuring daily viewing on YouTube in a manner similar to audiovisual media, Germany’s 
independent rating body AGF Videoforschung released its first results in March 2019,61 and 
discussions were reported to be ongoing within joint industry committees in other countries as 
well. This is the kind of independent and accessible measurement that can be useful in 
informing campaign strategies and negotiations over price when paired with some level of 
financial transparency. It also demonstrates that data protection rules are not an impediment 
for participating in such schemes, which should be based around nonpersonal, anonymized or 
pseudonymized data. 
<T>Our investigation found consistent calls for comparable and standardized measurement 
metric across all video inventory among those on the demand side, but some reservations 
expressed from representatives of AVMS providers on the demand side. Their concerns as to 
whether it would fairly represent the advantages of their inventory had more to do with the 
third function of data we identified that describes how it is used in the longer-term building of 
relationships and preferences. 
<H2>Telling the Story of Success 
<T1>The decisions about dividing up particular campaign budgets take place within the 
context of longer-term relationships and contracts that shape those decisions. These provide 
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the framework for the bulk commitments between agencies and inventory holders that garner 
the rebates and discounts. Inventory holders in all the countries we studied reported 
maintaining direct relationships with advertisers to understand their needs and to ensure their 
faith in the effectiveness of their inventory. Agencies must demonstrate performance to retain 
their clients, especially large global brands with which they may have multiyear, multicountry 
contracts. The evidence from our investigation indicates that because of a trend toward 
centralization and short termism, those telling their story with the kind of data generated by 
online inventory are at an advantage. Here aggregate, anonymized campaign and channel data 
and financial data are used to demonstrate performance and efficiency. 
<T>Two agency respondents and one from an AVMS provider reported having to deal with 
traders responsible for groups of countries in centralized procurement departments rather than 
nationally based marketing teams, and increasingly having to address short-term key 
performance indicators (KPIs). As the AVMS respondent described, their pitches were recently 
less about “the value of the quality or the context . . . and more about the net cost and the 
discounts and optimization and that kind of metrics.” One respondent who was on the receiving 
end of this for major global advertiser explained that what he did on a regional level was 
“review on a broader level how to allocate budget most efficiently across different channels 
and vendors so that we can maximize our discounts and our cost efficiencies.” It appeared that 
in the current environment advertisers are increasingly focused on efficiency, defined as the 
combination of performance and price, and therefore firms offering the data-intensive online 
inventory have an advantage. 
<T>Although television was reported by nearly all demand side respondents as being trusted 
for brand safety and environment quality, it was evident that AVMSs were at a disadvantage 
in terms of being able to demonstrate performance against short-term KPIs. Promoting their 
 
addressable TV options AVMSs speak the language of procurement and data-driven 
assessments of return on investment,62 and as mentioned earlier AVMS providers are 
cooperating to increase the scale of their offerings. Nevertheless, VSPs offering online 
inventory at great scale clearly have an advantage in terms of demonstrating efficiency as the 
observed data linking online advertising to website views, test drives booked, product sales, 
and so on, serves this need very well. 
<T>Though we did not have access to details on their expenditures and revenues, our evidence 
indicated agencies are increasingly making their profits from programmatic advertising, 
enabled by a lack of transparency and the complexity of the process. Getting the most out of 
programmatic buying requires specific expertise that must be regularly updated, which 
agencies can offer, and as mentioned earlier, only in France was there any transparency in their 
margins on this. One agency respondent admitted, “if you squeeze our remuneration, like we 
are doing pitches with no fees or fees close to zero then, of course, many of our choices are 
logically directed to the best option for us at basic economic level.” Two others confirmed 
charging programmatic advertising mainly on the gap between the value they get and what the 
clients could have gotten alone instead of on a fixed percentage. One of them explained: 
“everyone became competitive on price . . . and it became this ever-decreasing circle where 
you’re basically doing it almost for nothing. I suppose agencies were like we’ve got to find 
other ways to make money and those perhaps . . . haven’t necessarily been the most regulated 
practices,” essentially acknowledging the lack of transparency. 
<T>With advertisers increasingly motived by the need to show efficiency, there seems to be a 
preference in agencies for the inventory that can easily combine data measuring success with 
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price to demonstrate that efficiency, and for the inventory that can garner them the highest 
margins. These preferences shape the long-term relationships and buying decisions of 
advertisers and agencies. As mentioned earlier, advertiser objectives may not always call for 
highly specific targeting, yet the industry, it seems, is being pushed toward programmatic 
trading and reserve buying of online inventory despite reservations expressed across our 
sample about the use of personal data, the lack of transparency, and risks to brand safety. 
<H1>Policy Challenges in Leveling the Playing Field 
<T1>Our investigation into the dynamics on the playing field for video advertising identified 
data access and use to be a key source of unevenness. We found that types of nonpersonal data, 
mainly financial data and past performance data for campaigns and channels, were important 
to decision-making about how to spend advertising budgets on the demand side and competing 
effectively for those budgets on the supply side. Though it evened out the qualitative rules for 
advertising for AVMS providers and VSP, the AVMSD did not deal with data use. Competition 
policy scholarship has produced rich debates about potential dominance or unfair behavior 
related to platform data, resulting in interesting policy proposals for antitrust intervention or 
pro-competition regulation to achieve data openness or sharing.63 However, these tend to be 
focused on platform markets and the extent to which there are barriers to entry or undue 
concentration in those narrowly defined markets, rather on platforms as part of wider 
ecosystems that involve nonplatform players and competition in adjacent markets.64 In our 
investigation, looking at how data more generally functions, how it is used by all players in an 
ecosystem, has allowed us to see where platform data functions in the same or similar manner 
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to other kinds of data. Drawing parallels with how these other kinds of data are generated and 
accessed, here we consider the policy implications, more specifically what challenges need to 
be addressed in order to level the playing field and what policy options might be useful in 
meeting those challenges. 
<T>Table 1 presents an overview that gives a simplified description of the types of data being 
used in each function and the challenges posed by each of the functions of data for any policy 
aimed at leveling the playing field on which AVMS providers and VSPs are competing. 
<TT>TABLE 1 The Data Types and Policy Challenges Associate with the Three Functions of 
Data in Video Advertising 
<TCH>Function Data Types Levelness Policy Challenges 
<TB>Targeting User and audience data  Encouraging or removing barriers to data pooling or sharing 
among AVMS providers (with user consent) 
Strategy design User and audience data 
Campaign metrics ( e.g., impressions, 
click throughs, viewability) 
Financial (e.g., inventory price, 
discounts, auction details) 
Defining the level of aggregation and anonymization at which 
the relevant personal data becomes nonpersonal 
Encouraging demand side porting of nonpersonal data and 
competition among adserver and trading platforms 
Establishing basic levels of financial transparency (e.g., Sapin 
Law) 
 
Story of success Campaign metrics 
Financial (e.g., revenues, past inventory 
prices) 
Encouraging participation in independent measurement 
bodies and collective efforts at standardization (e.g., German 
JIC and YouTube) 
Enforcing financial reporting obligations on all inventory 
holders 
<T> Only those firms that have consent for its processing have access to the kind of personal 
identifiable data that enables a specific individual to be targeted by advertising. The kind and 
amount of data that Facebook or Google has on each of its users dwarfs the amount that other 
media currently gather from viewer log-ins to catch up services or through set-top boxes 
delivering addressable TV. Though our findings indicate that in the competition for advertising 
budgets the ability to target specific individual users is not always necessary, major AVMS 
providers in Europe are advancing in both the gathering of personal data and innovating in 
ways to offer targeting at scale to agencies and advertisers, including all though represented by 
our respondents. As Table 1 indicates the policy challenge would therefore be to determine 
how best to support AVMS providers in doing this. It could mean revising media plurality rules 
to allow collaboration, offering guidance on managing consent, or a variety of other 
interventions aimed at promoting collaboration and innovation in this direction. 
<T>Our findings suggest that greater attention needs to be paid to the aggregate data generated 
by the behavior of and characteristics of individuals, and the extent to which demand side actors 
have the ability to use, or port, this kind of data across the various channels of inventory 
suppliers. In taking to agency and advertiser representatives, what we found was not, as has 
been suggested, a “multi-homing” across similar options by advertisers that could simply 
 
choose another provider as long as they can take their own data.65 Instead it was more akin to 
hedging bets, spreading investment across a number of channels based on calculations of what 
is likely to reach the right people and achieve the desired outcome. 
<T>From the accounts of those interviewed, much of what seems to feed into the econometric 
models and strategy process through which they do this, was a constructed kind of data that 
“does not reflect truths about people, but by means of patterns and behavioral tracing it creates 
simulations of target groups.”66 For offline inventory this might be from panel surveys and 
audience measurement data. For online options it is anonymized or pseudonymized and 
aggregated observed data, often connected with past campaigns. Data such as from store card 
use, test drives booked, loyalty programs, and other sources can feed into planning across types 
of inventory, and all combine to provide an idea of what might reach certain groups and what 
approach might achieve an advertiser’s objectives. As mentioned earlier, we found problems 
arise from the fact that, unlike panel survey data, the former can lock agencies into particular 
buying options, and that unlike the metrics of audience measurement, the former is not 
independent and accessible to all players. 
<T>Agencies reported being locked into activating campaigns through particular buying 
platforms owned by major inventory holders, particularly Google and Facebook, by the fact 
that much of the data they used for planning a campaign had to stay within those ecosystems. 
This is despite the commitments made to competition authorities by Google to facilitate 
advertiser switching by allowing the porting of their own campaign activating data,67 and 
Google’s documentation for the Google Marketing Platform confirming that each client owns 
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their campaign data and can “take it out” in an anonymized form.68 This contradiction indicates 
that closer analysis is needed to define the point of anonymization and the interaction between 
the anonymous aggregate data and the personal data used for targeting the ad. 
<T>Data that has been sufficiently anonymized according to the guidance of the Article 29 
Working Party could potentially be considered nonpersonal data.69 Open display online video 
inventory, such as that of audiovisual media services and other publishers, can be traded 
through a number of tools, including those developed by these media themselves,70 and 
addressable TV can be traded in a similar manner to online inventory. These face the increasing 
level of concentration among intermediaries in programmatic trading and ad servers.71 
Enabling agencies and advertisers to spread their investments through rules that enable them 
to port their nonpersonal data and not be locked into particular intermediary platforms would 
seem necessary to level the playing field for other intermediaries and the collaborative 
initiatives of media companies for large-scale buying. 
<T>Encouraging portability on the demand side is not likely to compensate for the unevenness 
found in access to the campaign and channel data that contributes to the metrics for telling the 
story of success to advertisers. Neither will it help those negotiating for the discounts and 
rebates know the value of their inventory and or better assess where they stand in relation to 
the other inventory holders. Major social media and certain VSPs were described as 
unavoidable for reaching some audiences. “Ultimately, it’s not a matter, do you like it, do you 
not like it. This is where the eyeballs are,” explained one agency respondent. This in itself is 
not necessarily a problem. One could say the same thing about major broadcast television 
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stations in most countries. However, for broadcast media much of the data needed for designing 
a media strategy and planning a campaign is accessible, audited, and independent. 
<T>Audience measurement that is done by joint industry bodies and data from panel surveys 
can be bought or replicated. Inventory holders do not have all the insight into the impact of 
specific past campaigns, which is held on the demand side, but going into negotiations over 
discounts or rebates on prices and other conditions they each have an idea of the value of their 
broadcast inventory and a view of what each other can offer because it is to a large extent 
transparent. As the online equivalent to audience measurement data, the aggregated 
anonymized data observed from people’s behavior that contributes to campaign metrics could 
be considered just as essential for doing business. 
<T>This does not necessarily mean structural competition policy remedies are required to open 
up the necessary data. Following the model of broadcasting, VSPs could be encouraged to 
participate in independent and audited measurement systems. A “common currency” for a 
video impression does not necessarily have to be agreed. The example of YouTube’s inclusion 
in Germany’s independent measurement body shows that it is technically possible, though it is 
likely more detail and duration should be achieved for them to be meaningful to competition. 
In the countries studied, these processes appear to be moving slowly, and we did not find 
conclusive evidence as to whether resistance came from the platforms and/or from the other 
media already participating. 
<T>In all four countries studied, systems ensured some degree of transparency to advertisers 
and information necessary for oversight to regulators that put AVMSs on level with each other. 
Given the complexity of the trade in online video advertising and the numbers of those offering 
inventory, the share-based system could not easily be expanded to include online platforms. 
 
However, the French Sapin Law already has been providing a credible model, though one that 
should be adapted and perfected, and regulatory reporting requirements could be applied as in 
the Italian case. 
<H1>Conclusion 
<T1>The purpose of our investigation was to understand the conditions affecting the levelness 
of the playing field for video advertising. It revealed specific ways that uneven access to data 
was a source of advantage for online platforms offering video advertising inventory vis-à-vis 
the AVMSs that have traditionally relied on such advertising. Examining the role of data in 
decision-making and relationships involved in the distribution of advertising budgets, we 
identified three functions that characterize how data is being used and what types of data were 
being used in each function. 
<T>Our findings indicate that while there may be vast difference among players in the extent 
to which they can utilize personal data in the function of enabling targeting, these should not 
be the main focus of policy intervention aimed at leveling the playing field. AVMSs, and likely 
a variety of other media, competing to be part of strategies designed in media agencies are 
disadvantaged by the fact that they do not have equitable access to the anonymized aggregate 
personal data and nonpersonal data related to campaigns and channels. Such data feeds the 
metrics, against which competitors demonstrate relative efficacy and tell their own stories of 
success. Based on the evidence presented earlier, we argue that a case could be made that access 
to the aggregate anonymized, and therefore nonpersonal, data required to generate the 
equivalent of audience metrics is imperative for all those competing for advertising budgets. 
 
<T> By grounding our analysis in the AVMSD’s notion of levelness among players of different 
types rather than looking for evidence of unfair competition or barriers to entry in a market, we 
can see the relevance of policy solutions devised for ensuring a fair game before platforms 
entered the field. We suggest a priority of policy makers should be to encourage VSP 
participation in independent and audited industry-wide measurement systems, and that 
competition policy tools such as essential facility access requests could be used only as a 
fallback option to ensure the necessary data sharing in case of resistance.72 This kind of data, 
which is generated by user behavior but far removed from them as individuals, and which 
represents their collective role as an audience is also arguably the best candidate for designation 
as a public resource as suggested by Napoli.73 According to his argument such a designation 
would have much wider regulatory implications than forcing participation in independent 
accessible measurement, but it has been part of media regulation since the use of frequencies 
in many countries and merits consideration. 
<T>The situation with user data in the function of strategy making and media planning is 
complex because aggregate anonymized data is mixed with personal data from platforms, but 
also from third parties and advertisers, to target individuals. When it comes to actually 
activating a campaign or placing the ads, for the right person, even if he or she just happens to 
fit an archetype to be reached, the ad must be served to an IP address and therefore not 
anonymous, contributing to the “walled gardens” problem characteristic of the strategy design 
function. Our methodological approach produced evidence from the reports of practitioners 
and examination of the rules in which they operate, but this approach could not produce the 
kind of technical evidence on how data moves through the system required to determine exactly 
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where the boundaries of data gardens should be. Further investigation is needed to arrive at a 
definition of the point at which data becomes sufficiently anonymous to become nonpersonal 
in this context is needed, and what is accessible by whom at exactly which point. This could 
contribute to the development of codes or other instruments to enable data that does not need 
to be associate with an individual to be moved out of the “walled gardens” or facilitate other 
means of accessing the flows of such data. 
<T>One aim would be to encourage media agencies to utilize a range of tools for buying. If 
the trend toward concentration in ad serving intermediaries described by Geradin and Katsifis74 
continues, perhaps Rahman’s suggestion that online platforms be treated as public utilities with 
“new forms of oversight and accountability” based on norms such as nondiscrimination and 
common carriage75 could be considered only for ad servers.  
<T>Our approach of asking questions those in the industry how they made decisions and 
conducted business revealed that the much less talked about category of nonpersonal data 
related to financial transactions is also highly important in the competition for video 
advertising. The opacity of transactions in programmatic advertising has been cited as 
problematic in several policy reports, and it was raised by many of our respondents from all 
categories of industry players, including VSPs. Although there is no complete transparency in 
the trade of other advertising, we argue that more data should be made available to level the 
playing field. The French Sapin Law is a good model for this, perhaps with added reporting 
obligations in situations where a demand-side platform does not respond to a bid and the 
inclusion of requirements that some information is shared with all industry players. 
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<T>As van Dijck, Nieborg, and Poell have pointed out there is a need for more research into 
areas where platforms interact with other types of firms and actors within wider ecosystems.76 
Our investigation focused on one specific playing field on which a particular type of platform 
is in competition with another type of service. Within wider ecosystems there are likely to be 
many other areas where platforms compete with nonplatform players that merit investigation. 
Given how important it is to platform businesses, data is likely to be an important part of any 
picture in which they are involved, therefore we suggest that the approach we took to identify 
functions in which data is used both from and by platform and nonplatform players can be a 
useful way to draw parallels and understand the nature of competition in other areas. 
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